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Before embarking on details, here is one general piece of advice. One
often hears that modal (or some other) logic is pointless because it can
be translated into some simpler language in a first-order way. Take no
notice of such arguments.
Dana Scott (1970)
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Preface
This is the first part of a threefold survey on the subject of modal λ-calculi. Why
threefold? We believe that it is fair to say that work on constructive modal logic
spans three distinct yet intercommunicating streams:
Curry-Howard: Work with a Curry-Howard concerns λ-calculi that arose as
byproducts of the proof theory of modal logic, and their associated compu-
tational and categorical interpretations. This stream of work can be seen
to date as far back as the 1950s, but witnessed rapid development dur-
ing the 1990s, following the discovery of Girard’s Linear Logic. Tracing
the development of this material forms the subject of the first part of our
survey.
Metaprogramming: It was sooner or later realized—as a result of the work
on the Curry-Howard—that modal annotations can form the logical foun-
dation that is much needed for all sorts of metaprogramming, whether that
comes in the form of binding-time analysis, staging of computations, or
even partial evaluation. A flurry of developments on this stream happened
in the early 2000s, and further work continues to appear in the 2010s.
Other applied calculi: A third stream of work, which constitutes a radical
break from the proof-theoretic origins, is the use of modalities in all sorts
of calculi that are fine-tuned to specific task. There are many possible such
applications, ranging from security and depedency analysis to calculi for
homomorphic encryption.
Whereas the first part of the survey is mainly the territory of the present author,
the task of surveying the metaprogramming landscape—which should take up the
second part of this survey—is the domain of Mario Alvarez-Picallo (mario.alvarez-picallo@cs.ox.ac.uk).
We are actively on the lookout for a third co-author, in order to cover the vast
subject of applied calculi; please contact us for more information.
Finally, we also welcome any suggestions on comments on the present material.
The author can be reached by e-mail at alex.kavvos@cs.ox.ac.uk.
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1. Introduction: Proof theory for modal logics
The situation has given rise to various suggestions. One is that the
Gentzen format, which works so well for truth-functional operators,
should not be expected to work for intensional operators, which are far
from truth-functions. (But then Gentzen works well for intuitionistic
logic which is not truth-functional either.) Another suggestion is that
the great proliferation of modal logics is an epidemy from which modal
logic ought to be cured: Gentzen methods work for the important
systems, and the other should be abolished. ‘No wonder natural
deduction does not work for unnatural systems!’
Bull and Segerberg (2001)
The history of modal proof theory is a long and tortuous one, and not without
good reason. Attention shifted away from proof systems for modal logic quite
early in its development, for it was not at all evident whether any structural proof
system was appropriate. The blame was put on the ‘intensionality’ of modal logic,
or the lack of appropriate symmetries. Indeed, these views are explicitly stated
by Bull and Segerberg (2001) and echoed in the survey of Negri (2011). To make
matters worse, attempting to combine the Kripke semantics of intuitionistic logic
with those of modal logic leads to a bewildering variety of possibilities.
We shall survey a stream of work on natural deduction systems for a very specific
class of normal modal logics, which has been gradually handpicked over the years—
the constructive modal logics. These share several characteristics:
• The modalities  and ♦ are introduced independently, and not by the
classic law A ≡ ¬♦¬A or its dual, as is common. This is a welcome
feature of intuitionistic analysis of logical connectives.
• They possess a variety of reasonably well-behaved proof systems. In fact,
these logics have been selected over the years to admit analyses as close as
possible to the popular menu of proof-theoretic results: the cut-elimination
theorem of Gentzen (1935a,b) for sequent calculi, and the normalisation
theorem and subformula property of Prawitz (1965) for natural deduction.
Whether this goal has been achieved to a satisfying extent—or whether this
is possible at all—has been the subject of debate for a long time.
• As a consequence of the striking similarity of the proof-theoretic analysis
of these modal logic logics with that of intuitionistic propositional logic
(IPL), they admit a Curry-Howard isomorphism (Curry and Feys, 1958;
Howard, 1980): each proof may be seen as a construction for a type, which
is its formula. Consequently, we may read formulas as types, and proofs
as programs. See, for example, the classic text of Girard et al. (1989),
or the modern treatment by Sørensen and Urzyczyn (2006). This leads
to computational interpretations of modalities as type formers, as well as
associated modal λ-calculi.
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• Following the path, these logics all admit some sort of categorical seman-
tics, as pioneered for the typed λ-calculus and cartesian closed categories
by Lambek (1980). These are invariably some kind of cartesian-closed cat-
egory, coupled with a monoidal endofunctor perhaps coupled with some
additional categorical gadgets.
• In the same way that obtaining a constructive logic required eschewing the
Law of the Excluded Middle (LEM), there are some modal principles that
we have to eschew in order to obtain constructive modal logic. As in the
case of LEM, the principles we have to reject are regarded as self-evident
in traditional Kripkean analysis. These are usually
♦(A ∨B)→ ♦A ∨ ♦B and ¬♦⊥
or of a very similar form.
It is fair to say that, even though the first axiomatization of this kind is due to
Wijesekera (1990), the pioneers in adapting the Curry-Howard-Lambek isomor-
phism to modal logic were Bierman and de Paiva (1992, 1996, 2000), and Moggi
(1989, 1991).
There are also other multiple other directions situated within the intersection of
intuitionism and modal logics. One of the most popular alternatives, mostly referred
to simply as intuitionistic modal logic, was championed by Alex Simpson in his
thesis (Simpson, 1994). This approach is motivated by Kripkean model theory, and
indeed most of the effort is expended in devising appropriate Kripke semantics for
some modal logic whose propositional component is intuitionistic. Invariably, the
proof systems considered by Simpson do not model validity, but truth at a particular
world : judgments are of the form Γ ⊢ A@x, which is intended to be read as “under
assumptions Γ, A holds at world x.” Propositional assumptions aside, The context
Γ may also contain assumptions of the form xRy, with the intended meaning that
“world y is accessible from world x.” Ranalter (2010) studies embeddings of the
‘constructive’ systems into the ‘intuitionistic’ ones.
Even though there are very many sequent systems for intuitionistic modal logic,
we shall not survey sequent calculi here, despite their close relationship to natural
deduction systems. There is a wide variety of those, ranging from austere Gentzen-
style to far more radical proposals. The former were pioneered by Ohnisi and Matsumoto
(1957, 1959), and are surveyed by Ono (1998). Wansing (2002) surveys both ordi-
nary and ‘generalized’ sequent systems. Negri (2011) adopts an even wider view-
point, also covering work on some ‘non-traditional’ formalizations. A broader sur-
vey of the intersection of intuitionism, and modal logic, including applications to
computer science, is the editorial (de Paiva et al., 2004), which is followed up by
(Stewart et al., 2015).
Returning to our present concerns, we may list the following systems that fit our
aforementioned criteria:
• a constructive version of the Lewis system S4, which is known CS4;
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• a constructive version of the smallest normal modal logic K, which is known
as CK;
• constructive versions of the logic K4 and the logic of provability GL, both
entirely due to Bellin (1985); and
• propositional lax logic PLL, also known as computational logic, denoted CL.
• constructive linear temporal logic, CLTL
Of these, the logics CS4 and PLL/CL have been the subject of intense scrutiny.
The proof theory of CS4 has been a popular subject, ever since the days of Prawitz
(1965). Its categorical interpretation reveals that there is a latent universal property
underlying it, which makes for rather well-behaved proof systems, with plenty of
harmony. On the other hand, PLL/CL is the logic underlying Moggi’s monadic
metalanguage, which has enjoyed considerable attention as (a) a popular way to
structure denotational semantics, (b) a way to encapsulate impurities and effects in
functional languages, and (c) a pattern in which many programs can be structured,
in a modular way. As such, the underlying logic has generated some interest, even
if it was originally discovered and discarded by Curry (1952), mainly because of its
unusual properties.
The logic CK, a minimal modal extension of the intuitionistic propositional logic,
has received very little attention. It was devised as a fragment of proof systems for
K4 and GL by Bellin (1985), whose other proof systems have not been studied since
their publication.
Finally, CLTL is a very simple constructive fragment of classical Linear Temporal
Logic, involving only the ‘next’ operator. Notwithstanding its simplicity, it has
numerous applications in metaprogramming.
1.1. Preliminaries. All but two of our modal logics L shall be sets of formulae—
the theorems of the logic. These formulae are generated by the following Backus-
Naur form:
A,B ::= P | ⊥ | A ∧B | A ∨B | A→ B | A | ♦A
where P is drawn from a countable set of propositions. The two exceptions to this
rule replace the cases of A and ♦A by a single modality, ©A.
The sets of theorems will be generated by axioms, closed under some inference
rules. The set of axioms will always contain a complete axiomatization of intuition-
istic propositional logic (IPL). The set of inference rules will consist of the two rules
necessary to capture IPL, namely the axiom rule:
A is an axiom
⊢ A
and the rule of modus ponens :
⊢ A→ B ⊢ A
⊢ B
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As for the modal part, in all but two cases, we shall employ the necessitation rule,
namely
⊢ A
⊢ A
Finally, any logic L will be closed under substitution of theorems for propositional
constants.
2. Constructive S4
The founding stone of constructive modal logics has been the constructive logic
underlying the Lewis system S4 (Lewis and Langford, 1932). A simple axioma-
tization of CS4, due to Alechina et al. (2001), comprises the axioms of IPL, and
also
(K) (A→ B)→ (A→ B)
(4) A→ A
(T) A→ A
To obtain the diamond fragment, we add
(♦K) (A→ B)→ (♦A→ ♦B)
(♦4) ♦♦A→ ♦A
(♦T) A→ ♦A
Studies of the proof theory of CS4 abound, making it the most widely studied
constructive modal logic. The fundamental reason for this success can only be
grasped once one interprets its axioms categorically: take  to be a endofunctor
on a cartesian closed category. To interpret axiom K then, we need a natural
transformation
mA,B : A×B → (A×B)
which would make the functor monoidal. Then, to interpret axiom T we need
ǫ : ⇒ (−)
and to interpret axiom 4 we need
δ : ⇒ 2
These contraptions look like they could take the place of counit and comultiplication
of a monoidal comonad. As such, they give rise to an adjunction, either through
the Eilenberg-Moore or Kleisli constructions (see e.g. Awodey (2010)). Thus, there
is a latent universal property, which lends the proof systems of CS4 reasonable
symmetry, from which one can mould introduction and elimination rules.
The Kripke and algebraic semantics for CS4 have been thoroughly investigated
by Alechina et al. (2001).
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2.1. Early attempts. The first attempt at modal natural deduction was the sys-
tem for the () fragment of S4 and S5 defined and studied by Prawitz (1965). A
rule for diamond is also given, but was neither analyzed nor discussed. Prawitz con-
siders the obvious solution: if all assumptions are modalized, then we are allowed
to put a box in front of the conclusion. In sequent-style notation,
Γ ⊢ A
Γ ⊢ A
where
(A1, . . . , An) := A1, . . . ,An
A system for S5 is also obtained if assumptions are either modalized, or the negation
of a modalized formula.
Prawitz’ systems are thoroughly criticized in (Bierman and de Paiva, 2000). Their
main defect are that they are not closed under substitution: if we substitute any
derivation of Ai which has open non-modal assumptions at the top, then we do
not necessarily get a derivation whose final step is not valid: it is no longer the case
that all assumptions are modalized.
Here is a classic example of this phenomenon, taken from op. cit. Suppose that
we have a derivation of the form
·
·
·
A ⊢ B
A ⊢ B
Letting Γ = C → A,A, we derive
Γ ⊢ C → A Γ ⊢ C
Γ ⊢ A
Substituing, now, this derivation of  for the assumption in A ⊢ B, we get that
Γ ⊢ C → A Γ ⊢ C
Γ ⊢ A
·
·
·
A ⊢ B
A ⊢ B
Γ ⊢ B
Eliminating the detour, we would have
·
·
·
Γ ⊢ B
Γ ⊢ B
which is not a valid application of the introduction rule at all: A bears no box in
Γ.
The inherent difficulties of this system were suspected by Prawitz, mainly be-
cause there are roundabout ways to derive formulas, i.e. ineliminable detours. In
(Prawitz, 1965, §VI.2), he introduces a weaker restriction by the name of essentially
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modal formulas. However, it is noted in (Bierman and de Paiva, 2000, §8) that this
system eliminates too many detours : categorically speaking, it forces A ∼= A.
Some more early work, none of which explicitly attributed to Prawitz, is surveyed
by Satre (1972). Prawitz’ rule appears asI4 and is attributed to Ohnisi and Matsumoto
(1957, 1959), but its proof-theoretic significance is not discussed.
2.2. The Experience of Linear Logic. Things took a radical turn with the
discovery of Linear Logic by Girard (1987). The explicit control of assumptions1
seemed to pave the way for a multitude of applications in logic and computation.
One of the first goals of the community was to isolate an natural deduction sys-
tem for the smallest fragment of Linear Logic, namely Intuitionistic Linear Logic
(denoted ILL).2 This would amount to a very basic linear λ-calculus, which would
occupy central ground in numerous applications. It so happened that the advance-
ments made in this field had a significant impact on the study of natural deduction
for modal logics, and so we rapidly survey them here.
An attempt to produce a system of categorical combinators by Girard and Lafont
(1986) and Lafont (1988) led to the first formulation of natural deduction for ILL
by Abramsky (1990, 1993). Even though it served its original purpose, Abramsky’s
treatment of the “of course” (!) modality was similar to Prawitz’ for S4, and hence
not closed under substitution. A counterexample was discovered by Wadler (1991,
1992, 1994), who also realized that whenever substitution accidentally leads to a
valid deduction, then soundness of the obvious interpretation in the categorical
semantics of Seely (1989) necessitates that !A ∼= !A ⊗ !A.
The challenge was immediately taken up by Bierman et al. (1992) and Benton et al.
(1993), whose treatment led to a rather complicated system: as their formulation
of natural deduction was based on generalized rules in the style Schroeder-Heister
(1984), the λ-terms of their language contained explicit substitutions (Abadi et al.,
1991). This system was very influential in subsequent developments for modal logic.
Alternative syntax for ILL was also proposed by Troelstra (1995), the system of
whom is based on adapting Prawitz’ ‘essentially modal formulae’ restriction from
S4 to ILL; this solves the problem with substitution, but also forces !A ∼= !A⊗ !A.
A further breakthrough occurred when the style of Girard’s Logic of Unity
(Girard, 1993) was distilled by Andreoli (1992) and Wadler (1993, 1994) into a
new syntax involving two contexts—one for ‘linear’ and one for ‘intuitionistic’
(“banged”) variables. An even simpler system of the same kind was rediscovered by
Plotkin (1993), and extensively studied by his student Barber (1996, 1997). This
logic is known as DILL (Dual Intuitionistic Linear Logic), and still comprises one
of the two state-of-the-art systems for ILL.
1It is interesting to remind the reader that controlling weakening and contraction of assumptions
was an early and now-defunct goal of modal logics, through the notion of strict implication; see
(Girard, 1987, §II.2).
2Girard’s presentation was in terms of an expertly symmetric sequent calculus for Classical Linear
Logic
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Another kind of system was produced Benton (1994), which involves two different
types of sequent: intuitionistic and linear. Benton’s system offers very convenient
view of the semantics of ILL—for which see Mellie`s (2009)—as a linear-non-linear
adjunction. This is also another type of system which we may view as the state
of the art, and often the initial point of further study. Even though this style of
system is found in more programming applications nowadays, it does not appear
to have exerted any influence at all on the study of modalities.
2.3. The Bierman & de Paiva system. Very soon after contributing to the ILL
system in Bierman et al. (1992) and Benton et al. (1993), Bierman and de Paiva
(1992, 1996, 2000) noticed that the rules for the “of course” (!) modality of ILL
are really the same as those for S4. It was an easy step to remove the structural
restrictions of ILL, in order to uncover a natural deduction and term assignment
system for CS4.
The approach employed by Benton et al. (1993) for ILL, and exploited by Bierman and de Paiva
(1992) for CS4 is based on the same underlying principle:
If the modal substitution (cut) rule is not admissible,
then “bolt it” onto the introduction rule.
That is: if the strategy of requiring that all assumptions are modalized in order to
infer a modal formula breaks substitution, then simply include a side condition of
the form “. . . and, by the way, we can fill in some deduction for these modalized
formulae already.” Hence their introduction rule:
Γ ⊢M1 : A1 . . . Γ ⊢Mn : An x1 : A1, . . . , xn : An ⊢ N : B
Γ ⊢ box N with M1, . . . ,Mn for x1, . . . xn : B
Except for the fact it works, there is almost nothing good about this rule. It
appears to be an introduction rule, yet the connective it introduces also appears in
the conclusion of the (minor) premises, so it is also a cut rule! This is coupled with
the obvious way to eliminate boxes, namely
Γ ⊢M : A
Γ ⊢ unbox M : A
which corresponds to the axiom A→ A. The associated β-rule is
unbox (box N with M1, . . . ,Mn for x1, . . . xn) −→ N [M1/x1, . . . ,Mn/xn]
Thus, to modalize a formula, (1) we need to be able to prove it only on modal
assumptions, and (2) we must be able to fullfil all of them. Their proofs are then
captured as part of the proof term, which, in the spirit of Abadi et al. (1991),
constitute an explicit substitution. The explicit substutitions are then effected en
masse when the proof term is ‘unboxed’ (cf. evaluated, interpreted).
Contrary to what is stated in (Bierman and de Paiva, 2000), this introduction
rule for box does not appear in (Satre, 1972), and is their own invention. The rest
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of (Bierman and de Paiva, 2000) is dedicated to the study of the resulting natural
deduction system and λ-calculus, as well as its categorical semantics.
The original system of Bierman and de Paiva (1992, 1996) was extended by
Kobayashi (1997) with a rule for diamond, which was then incorporated into the
journal version of their article (Bierman and de Paiva, 2000). We may introduce a
diamond at any time:
Γ ⊢M : A
Γ ⊢ dia M : ♦A
Eliminating a diamond can only be done in conjunction with a bunch of boxed
assumptions. Namely, if we use exactly some boxed variables xi : Ai and a single
variable y : B to produce a term of diamond type, then, if we fulfill all the boxed
assumption and provide something of diamond type for the y : B variable, we can
indeed produce the term of diamond type:
Γ ⊢M1 : A1 . . . Γ ⊢ N : ♦B x1 : A1, . . . , xn : An, y : B ⊢ N : ♦C
Γ ⊢ let dia y = N in N with M1, . . . ,Mn for x1, . . . , xn : ♦C
with the reduction rule
let dia y = dia P in N with M1, . . . ,Mn for x1, . . . , xn
−→ N [ ~Mi/~xi, P/y]
Putting the lack of ‘good symmetries’ aside, there are deeper flaws in the afore-
mentioned rules. Notably, a large number of commutative conversions are needed
to expose ‘hidden’ redices, which spoil the so called subformula property. As an
example of this phenomenon, quoted by Pfenning and Wong (1995), consider the
term
box (unbox f c) with (box (λx : A.x)) for f
and notice that it has ‘hidden’ an obvious redex by ‘splitting it’ between the term
and the explicit substitution. The subformula property breaks, and this detour
cannot be eliminated—not even in conversion, let alone in reduction.
The issue of commutative conversions is known to arise from rules for positive
connectives in Natural Deduction, such as those for disjunction (∨I) and existence
(∃I)—for a particularly perspicuous discussion, see (Girard et al., 1989, §10.1).
These rules are very similar to rules in the style of Schroeder-Heister (1984), which
in turn are very similar to those of Bierman and de Paiva’s system.
In designing their system for ILL, Bierman et al. (1992) and Benton et al. (1993)
included some of commutative conversions in their definition of reduction, whilst
only recovering the complete set in the categorical interpretation. However, they
do not investigate the subformula propert at all. Similarly, Bierman and de Paiva
(2000) do present most commutative conversions as conversions between natural
deduction proofs, but do not push them down to the term level. As such, they prove
neither the subformula property nor completeness of the categorical semantics.
These issues were resolved by Goubault-Larrecq (1996a), who discusses the
present system and systematically remedies its shortcomings. In the process, he
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provides full proofs of all common logical properties, but without considering cate-
gorical models. Goubault-Larrecq remarks that the introduction of explicit substi-
tutions necessitates the addition of further structural rules concerning them. For
example, the term
box λu.uyz with x, x for y, z
does not correspond to a cut-free proof, but the ability to contract the two x’s to
box λu.uyy with x for y
does. Similarly, the non-occurence of variables that have been explicitly substituted
for, i.e.
box λx.x with M for y
should really be weakened to
box λx.x with 〈〉 for 〈〉
All is well with these rules, which explicitly mirror contraction and weakening on the
level of explicit substitutions, and indeed they are mentioned by Bierman and de Paiva
(2000) as well. Surely, we also need exchange, which would provide us with
box M with P,Q for x, y =β box M with Q,P for y, x
which he also includes. He then proceeds to argue that these rules, whilst necessary,
they jeopardize the computational meaning of the system. Indeed, these are rules
traditionally found as structural rules in sequent calculi, but in natural deduction
they are usually admissible.
To highlight why the above issues constitute an appreciable shortcoming, we need
to recall that, in proof theory, it is natural deduction proofs that are thought to com-
prise the “real proof objects.” In contrast, sequent calculi allow for more symmetry
precisely so they can facilitate proof-theoretic analysis. To quote (Girard et al.,
1989, §5.4):
“The translation from sequent calculus into natural deduction is
not 1-1: different proofs give the same deduction, [...]
In some sense, we should think of the natural deduction rules
as the true “proof” objects. The sequent calculus is only a system
which enable [sic] us to work on these objects [...]
In other words, the system of sequents is not primitive, and the
rules of the calculus are in fact more or less complex combinations
of rules of natural deduction [...]”
It follows, argues Goubault-Larrecq, that the Bierman and de Paiva calculus does
not expose the computational behaviour of S4 proofs: if it did, it would need no
structural rules at all.
2.4. The Goubault-Larrecq system. To mitigate the deficit introduced by the
extra structural rules in Bierman and de Paiva’s system, Goubault-Larrecq (1996a,b,c,
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1997b) proceeds to define his own system, namely the λevQ calculus. The calculus
itself is a very peculiar mixture of categorical combinators (Curien, 1993) and ex-
plicit substitutions (Abadi et al., 1991). He then proceeds to exhaustively study it,
in four manuscripts of epic proportions.
One of Goubault-Larrecq’s fundamental contributions is that, in (Goubault-Larrecq,
1996a, §2) and (Goubault-Larrecq, 1996b, §2.3), he is the first to draw attention
to the similarity of the computational behaviour of CS4 to the quoting features of
LISP (see Bawden (1999)) and the reflective towers of Smith (1984) (see also the
discussion in Goubault-Larrecq (1997a). Even though the connection with staged
metaprogramming was thrust into the limelight by Davies and Pfenning (2001)—
see §2.6—this particular line of thought has not been subjected to further investi-
gation, save from one comment in op. cit., who remark that the behaviour of their
modal language “is closer to the quotations of a “semantically rationalized dialect”
of Lisp, called 2-Lisp,” referring to the intermediate, ‘non-reflective’ stepping stone
for Smith’s reflective towers (Smith, 1984). However, it seems that the connec-
tion between constructive linear temporal logic and metaprogramming in LISP is
closer—see §6.
2.5. The Martini & Masini, Pfenning & Wong systems. Following previous
work by Masini (1992, 1993) on 2-sequent calculi and an associated system of natu-
ral deduction, Martini and Masini (1996) present and study a system of intuition-
istic 2-sequents and an associated levelled λ-calculus that, with minor structural
variations, which seemingly captures all three logics CK, CK4, and CS4 (this latter
correspondence they do not prove). In some ways, their system is elegant and crisp;
but the metatheory is difficult, and the levelling on the λ-calculus is complicated.
No treatment of the ♦ modality is provided.
Drawing impetus from the above presentation, Pfenning and Wong (1995) “flat-
ten out” its two-dimensional structure into a stack of contexts. This provides them
with a more workable calculus based on the same idea, and allows them to eas-
ily prove various meta-theoretic properties. For illustration, we use the improved
version found in (Davies and Pfenning, 2001, §5). A sequent has the form
Ψ; Γ ⊢M : A
where Ψ is a list of contexts, the context stack. The idea is that, every Γi in
Ψ = Γ1, . . . ,Γn represents an ‘arbitrary world’ reachable from Γi−1. The word
‘world’ in this context is supposed to invoke the look and feel of Kripke semantics
(Kripke, 1963), but the idea is more subtle, and no actual accessibility relation is
involved.
A context stack of the form
Ψ; Γ; ·
(where · is the empty context) is meant to be thought of as a ‘path’ through Ψ,
leading to the world Γ, and then into some arbitrary world reachable from Γ. So,
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if something holds at the end of this path, i.e.
Ψ; Γ; · ⊢M : A
then it follows that the same thing holds at every world we can reach from Γ. In
the language of Kripke, A holds at Γ:
Ψ; Γ ⊢ box M : A
This is the introduction rule. Of course, we can only use variables from the current
world, i.e. the variable rule is
Ψ; Γ, x:A,Γ′ ⊢ x : A
The fundamental tenet is the following:
Force terms of type A to be closed with respect to any world
accessible from the current one, but allow them to use whatever
is available in the ‘current world’ (Γ), or a world visited in the
path to the current one (Ψ).
The elimination rule, which allows us to ‘push’ boxed terms in some world forwards,
in order to recover them in any ‘accessible’ world. For example,
· ;x : A ⊢ x : A
x : A; Γ ⊢ unbox1 x : A
is a way to push the variable x to any arbitrary accessible world. In full generality,
if we have a term Ψ; Γ ⊢ M : A then we can push the it to whichever accessible
world we desire:
Ψ; Γ; Γ1; . . . ; Γn ⊢ unboxn M : A
no matter how far in the ‘future’ (Γ1, . . . ,Γn) we go. The corresponding β-rule is
unboxn (box M) −→ {n/1}M
where {n/p} is a relatively involved operation on syntax which relabels occurrences
of unboxn in a consistent way.
The notion of ‘accessible world’ is very flexible, in that restricting it allows us to
limit the system to the logics CK or CK4–see §3, §4. But this is a system for CS4,
and if—as in the Kripke semantics for S4—our accessibility relation is reflexive,
then the present is accessible, and we may as well ‘unbox’/evaluate anything we
have:
Ψ; Γ ⊢M : A
Ψ;Γ ⊢ unbox0 M : A
This corresponds to axiom T : A→ A. And if our accessibility relation is transi-
tive, we allow all constructs unboxn, for n = 1, 2, . . . , so we may push anything as
far down an accessible chain of worlds, obtaining a version of the logic CK4 with ax-
iom 4. Even further, if we limit ourselves to the case n = 1, we get simply CK. This
is an observation that neither Pfenning and Wong (1995) nor Davies and Pfenning
(2001) capitalized on even though they were the first to make it.
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2.6. The Davies & Pfenning systems. Davies and Pfenning (1996, 1999, 2001)
suggested that one can intuitively read values of type A as “code of type A,” in an
interpretation that the present author callsmodality-as-intension. The fundamental
idea was first aired in (Pfenning and Wong, 1995), and is this: if we interpret box
as an intensional type, then programming in that type theory really corresponds
to metaprogramming: manipulating terms at modal types exactly corresponds to
manipulating code, in a logical and type-safe way.
Davies and Pfenning (2001) present two systems for CS4: the leaner version
of the system of Pfenning and Wong (1995) that we have just described (therein
called the ‘implicit’ formulation), and a two-context calculus (the ‘explicit’ system),
which is eerily similar to what one were to obtain obtain if they were to remove
linear restrictions from the system DILL of Barber (1996) and Plotkin (1993). This
is, however, independent of the work of Barber and Plotkin, but shares common
ancestry with it in the calculi of Girard (1993), Andreoli (1992), and Wadler (1993,
1994). We call the dual-context calculus of Davies and Pfenning by the name DCS4
(‘dual constructive S4’).
Translations are provided between the ‘implicit’ and ‘explicit’ version, along
with proofs of correctness. The connection with metaprogramming comes from
an embedding of two-level λ-calculus of Nielson and Nielson (1992) in the ‘implicit
system.’ The two-level λ-calculus, descended from an untyped predecessor devised
by Gomard and Jones (1991), is a language where expressions are annotated (and
type-checked) as being available in two stages: either at compile-time, or run-
time. This is done in such a way that that compile-time expressions never depend
on run-time expressions and can be evaluated in advance. The contribution of
Davies and Pfenning (1996, 1999, 2001) is the demonstration that the two-level
calculus can be embedded in a fragment of their ‘implicit’/context-stack CS4 sys-
tem, which corresponds to the logic CK. This led to a flurry of developments in
calculi for metaprogramming, and is the beginning point of the second part of this
survey; see also §6.
Sequents of DCS4 have the form
∆ ; Γ ⊢M : A
The variables occurring in ∆ are considered to be ‘boxed’: ∆ is a modal context. In
contrast, Γ is exactly like the run-of-the-mill intuitionistic context we are used to.
What is code? Surely something that does not depend on normal, value variables;
only code can contribute to its making:
∆ ; · ⊢M : A
∆ ; Γ ⊢ boxM : M
This is the introduction rule. As it may be readily witnessed, it encapsulates an
elegant way to enforce the constraint that code should only depend on code.
The pattern in dual-context systems it that the elimination rule is a cut rule.
That is, the elimination construct is a very simple explicit substitution. In this
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particular case, it is used to substitute code for a modal variable:
∆ ; Γ ⊢ box M : M ∆, u:A ; Γ ⊢ N : C
∆ ; Γ ⊢ let box u⇐M in N : C
The reduction rule is the obvious one:
let box u⇐ boxM in N −→ N [M/u]
The rationale is this: the rest of the calculus is responsible for controlling how modal
assumptions are used, and the elimination rule is used to substitute for one of them.
This constitutes splitting up of the introduction rule of Bierman and de Paiva
(2000) into two halves, which we then use in the pattern of introduction and elim-
ination.
What happens to the unbox construct in op. cit. then? The answer is that we
hide it in a second variable rule. A modal variable is code; surely we can evaluate
this code to obtain a value:
∆, u : A,∆′ ; Γ ⊢ u : A
This seemingly innocuous ‘variable rule’ is actually a defining feature of the system:
it is the only way in which we can use a modal variable, and it involves unboxing it.
Using this elimination rule, rule, one is able to write down a term of type A→ A,
which corresponds to the axiom T of CS4.
In a remarkably lucid sequel, Pfenning and Davies (2001) attempt to justify their
dual-context system using the philosophical approach of Martin-Lo¨f (1996), and also
include the possibility modality ♦, as previously presented by Bierman and de Paiva
(2000) and Kobayashi (1997). They also show how one may embed the proposi-
tional lax logic CL/PLL in the system, thus recapturing the monadic metalanguage
of Moggi (1991) through their system—see §5.2.
To deal with ♦, a special type of sequent is introduced. Let us call it a ‘possibility
judgments,’ and write ∆ ; Γ ⊢M÷A for it. Possibility judgments ⊢M÷A shall be
read as ‘M is a proof that A is possible.’ If A is true, then it is certainly possible;
i.e. normal sequents are included in possibility judgments:
∆ ; Γ ⊢M : A
∆ ; Γ ⊢M ÷A
This step happens ‘silently’ in op. cit. but we prefer to make it explicit for the
sake of clarity. Next, we internalise the possibility judgment, using the ♦ to stand
for it. The introduction rule procees almost tautologically: if M is possible, then
it is true that M is possible:
∆ ; Γ ⊢M ÷A
∆ ; Γ ⊢M : ♦A
So far we have done nothing more than ensure that truth implies possibility. The
elimination rule completes this picture. Suppose that there exists a ‘possible world’
of which we know nothing else, except that A is true. Suppose, furthermore, that
assuming only this fact, that A is true, we can show C to be possible. Then, if A
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is possible in this world, then C is possible in this world as well. In symbols:
∆ ; Γ ⊢M : ♦A ∆ ; x : A ⊢ E ÷ C
∆ ; Γ ⊢ let dia x =M in E : ÷C
The associated β-rule is
let dia x = dia E in F → F 〈〈E/x〉〉
and we shall now define the substitution operator 〈〈·/·〉〉.
The reader may think that, surely, we could avoid introducing a separate type
of sequent for possibility. Yet, there is subtlety that is easy to miss, and which we
will use to define the substitution operator. Notice that if ∆ ; Γ ⊢ M ÷ C then M
can be of one of two forms:
• M can be any term; or
• M can be of the form let dia x =M in E
So, let us define a syntactic category of proof expressions, E:
E ::= M | let dia x =M in E
It follows that, since we only use 〈〈E/x〉〉 with proof expressions E, we can define
it by induction on E rather than by induction on F in F 〈〈E/x〉〉. In the case of a
term, it devolves to regular substitution:
F 〈〈M/x〉〉 := F [M/x]
But in the case of a proof expression let dia x =M in E, we define
F 〈〈let dia y =M in E〉〉 := let dia y =M in F 〈〈E/x〉〉
This definition unfolds proof expressions in such a way that fewer commuting con-
versions are necessary. A similar trick is used in the λ-calculus for the lax modality
also introduced in op. cit.—see §5.2.
The computational interpretation of the diamond modality was further elabo-
rated by Pfenning (2001), who demonstrates that we may think of terms of type
♦A as proofs of A whose structure has been hidden. That is, they are proofs of A,
but their internal structure is invisible: they are proof-irrelevant. Pfenning (2001)
develops a type theory based on the juxtaposing the two extremes of this spectrum:
on one hand, terms of box type are only equal up to α-equivalence; on the other
hand, terms of diamond type are all equal. Note that, in order to avoid elimina-
tion rules that look like cut rules, this type theory involves three different types
of λ-abstraction: one for ‘boxed’ (intensional), one for intuitionistic, and one for
‘diamond’ (proof-irrelevant) variables. Pfenning’s type theory has not yet been put
to the test of semantical (and/or categorical) analysis.
Ghani et al. (1998) also discuss DCS4, which they use to repeat the exercise of
embedding two-level languages in it, after suitably extending it with more compli-
cated forms of explicit substitutions.
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2.7. Categorical Semantics of CS4. The first to work out the categorical se-
mantics for CS4 seem to be Bierman and de Paiva (1992, 1996, 2000): they showed
that, to interpret the box fragment of CS4 soundly, one only needs a cartesian
closed category with a monoidal comonad.
To interpret the diamond, one needs a -strong monad, a notion introduced by
Kobayashi (1997): that is, a monad (♦, η, µ), along with a -strength
tA,B : A× ♦B → ♦(A×B)
which is a natural transformation that satisfies appropriate coherence conditions.
The full definition may be found in (Kobayashi, 1997) or (Bierman and de Paiva,
2000)
However, because of the deficiencies of their term calculus, Bierman and de Paiva
failed to take into account all the necessary commuting conversions, and hence
did not prove a completeness result. This achivement is again due to Kobayashi
(1997), and also encompasses his rules for ♦. Kobayashi also shows that, were one
were to adopt η-rules for box constructs, then one needs a cartesian comonad to
achieve completeness, namely a strong monoidal comonad, which also happens to be
product-preserving between cartesian categories. Further discussion of categorical
semantics for CS4 also appears in (Alechina et al., 2001).
Concrete constructions of models are rare. Goubault-Larrecq and Goubault
(1999b,a, 2003) produce some of the few known constructions of concrete models
based on (1) the standard category Cpo of complete partial orders (ubiquitously
present in domain theory and most early attempts at semantics for programming
languages); (2) the category CGHaus of compactly-generated Hausdorff spaces;
and (3) the category of augmented simplicial sets. Of these, the last model is
proven to be complete, in the sense of Friedman (1975): if two terms are equal in
every simplicial augmented model, then the proof theory equates them as well; see
(Goubault-Larrecq and Goubault, 2003).
A different categorical model for CS4, again on the category Cpo of complete
partial orders, is presented in (Kobayashi, 1997). The construction is based on a
comonad of Brookes and Geva (1991, 1992). Note, however, that this comonad also
satisfies A → A naturally in A, so it is perhaps not the best model to illustrate
the computational behaviour of CS4.
3. Constructive K
The logic CK can be understood as the smallest normal modal logic extending
intuitionistic propositional logic (IPL). That is, we only add the axiom
(K) (A→ B)→ (A→ B)
in order to obtain its box fragment. To also obtain the diamond fragment, we throw
in
(♦K) (A→ B)→ (♦A→ ♦B)
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A logic very close to CK was the very first constructive modal logic to be axioma-
tized, and can almost be credited to Wijesekera (1990), but not entirely: Wijesek-
era’s logic also included ♦⊥ → ⊥, which—though adequate for his application—
complicates the analysis of the logic substantially. ‘Pure CK’ itself was introduced
alongside its Curry-Howard interpretation by Bellin et al. (2001), and its Kripke
semantics were worked out by Mendler and de Paiva (2005).
The natural deduction system for CK introduced by Bellin et al. (2001) is a frag-
ment of a natural deduction system for classical provability logic (GL), discovered
and studied by one of the authors in the 1980s (Bellin, 1985). The central idea
underlying it is the same as those of the Bierman and de Paiva system for CS4: if
the substitution/cut rule is not admissible, build it in the introduction rule using
explicit substitutions. The difference is that we drop the requirement that assump-
tions are boxed. The rule becomes
Γ ⊢M1 : A1 . . . Γ ⊢Mn : An x1 : A1, . . . , xn : An ⊢ N : B
Γ ⊢ box N with M1, . . . ,Mn for x1, . . . xn : B
As one may see, x1, . . . xn are available as ‘values’ within N , but we may only place
a box in front of B when all the assumptions going into its making are ‘boxed.’
Curiously, even though Bellin, de Paiva and Ritter were the first to seriously pro-
pose a proof-theoretic study of this formulation, it seems that—according to Satre
(1972)—a rule ‘much like it’ was suggested by E. J. Lemmon during a lecture in
1966. This rule appears as I1 in op. cit. where it is shown that adding it to
classical natural deduction comprises a system deductively equivalent to classical
K.
If explicit substitutions for CS4 were problematic, then the situation for CK is
hopeless: the duality between introduction and elimination ceases to exist alto-
gether, for there is no elimination rule at all! To match this perfectly, the only
plausible ‘reduction rule’ is very similar to one of the ‘secondary’ commuting con-
versions suggested by Goubault-Larrecq (1996a) in the context of CS4. Its function
is to unbox any ‘canonical’ terms in the explicit substitutions; e.g
box yx with y, (box M with z for z) for y, x
−→ box y(box M) with y, z for y, z
in an appropriate context for y and z.
In the original presentation of Bellin et al. (2001) there were multiple techni-
cal deficiencies which were remedied by Kakutani (2007). Kakutani’s paper also
contains many other gems: a call-by-value version; a CPS transformation from
the call-by-value to the call-by-name version; and soundness and completeness of
categorical semantics.
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In the final part of his paper, Kakutani (2007) extends the calculus to CK4 and
CS4 by including type-indexed constants,
ǫA : A→ A
δA : A→ A
along with some rather complicated equations that govern their behaviour. Finally,
he proves that, were we to extend the system with the extra structural rules of
Goubault-Larrecq (1996a) on explicit substitutions, as in the case for CS4, one can
translate the DCS4 calculus of Pfenning and Davies (2001) to it.
The state of the art for the box fragment of CK is thus represented by a
thoroughly-studied system of explicit substitutions.
3.1. Other systems. There is also another system CK, a dual-context formula-
tion discussed by Bellin et al. (2001) and de Paiva and Ritter (2011). We do not
dwell much on it, as it is seriously pathological (e.g. weakening is not admissi-
ble). de Paiva and Ritter (2011) also broadly survey ‘non-standard’ systems for
CK, including those in the style of Fitch, and reiterate the need for a better system.
3.2. Categorical Semantics of CK. The categorical semantics of CK were un-
derstood by Bellin et al. (2001) to be a monoidal endofunctor, which is the sole
ingredient required to interpret the (K) axiom. The proof of soundness and com-
pleteness for the system of Bellin et al. (2001), in its amended formulation, was
provided by Kakutani (2007).
If one wishes to interpret the diamond as well, Bellin et al. (2001) and de Paiva and Ritter
(2011) remark that we also need a natural transformation,
stA,B : A× ♦B → ♦(A ×B)
This is not as strong as the -strong transformation of Kobayashi (1997) for CS4,
nor as strong as the strong monads of Moggi (1991). It lies somewhere in between,
and there is no discussion of any coherence conditions it may need to obey. There
is no known proof of soundness or completeness for this fragment: following the
amendments to the calculus presented by Kakutani (2007) in order to verify the
proof, we consider the statement in (Bellin et al., 2001) wholly unreliable.
4. Constructive K4 & GL
The only attempt at a natural deduction system for logics such as K4 and GL
(Provability Logic) can be found in an obscure paper of Bellin (1985). Therein, a
system for classical GL is presented, with systems for K and K4 appearing as frag-
ments. We remind the reader that the axiom 4, namely A → A, is derivable
in provability logic; see, for example, Boolos (1994) or Artemov and Beklemishev
(2002).
Historically speaking, Bellin’s system is the first one with explicit substitutions.
One can thus expect that it is not particularly well-behaved. The situation is
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worsened by the inclusion of rules for classical logic, which as is well known cause
problems with normalization. Nevertheless, the paper is very much concerned with
proof theory, and soon the focus of his paper shifts to the ‘intuitionistic’ fragment
of his system. Unfortunately, the solution he provides is rather complicated, and
we cannot reproduce it in its entirety here.
We can, however, present his rules. The key idea that yields K4 amounts to
standing halfway between K and S4. In term assignment, the appropriate rule
would look like so:
Γ ⊢ P1 : A1 . . . Γ ⊢ Pn : An
Γ ⊢ Q1 : B1 . . . Γ ⊢ Q1 : B1
x1 : A1, . . . , xn : An, y1 : B1, . . . , ym : Bm ⊢ N : C
Γ ⊢ box N with P1, . . . , Pn, Q1, . . . , Qm for x1, . . . xn, y1, . . . , ym : C
In the Bierman and de Paiva system for CS4, the types of all the free variables in
N had to be ‘boxed’—i.e. they had to be of modal type. In the Bellin, de Paiva
and Ritter system for CK, no types of variables at all had to be boxed—they were
available within the (major) premise without a modality. The case of K4 sends us
straight to the halfway house, for we need both. But, once more, we have to fulfill
all these assumptions, modal or not, with terms of modal/‘boxed’ type.
Why might this be? Intuitively, CS4 also had a rule for ‘unboxing’ things, cor-
responding to the axiom T. Therefore, we did not lose anything by requiring that
all assumptions are ‘boxed,’ for we could ‘unbox‘ them whenever we needed that:
x1 : A1, . . . , xn : An ⊢ (. . . unbox xi . . . ) : B
In K4 this is not available, so we have to make provisions to accept both ‘code’ and
‘values.’
How can one adapt this to work for GL, then? The answer is to make the above
rule even more complicated, by adding a ‘boxed’ diagonal reference:
Γ ⊢ P1 : A1 . . . Γ ⊢ Pn : An
Γ ⊢ Q1 : B1 . . . Γ ⊢ Q1 : B1
x1 : A1, . . . , xn : An, y1 : B1, . . . , ym : Bm, z : C ⊢ N : C
Γ ⊢ fix z in N with P1, . . . , Pn, . . . , Q1, . . . , Qm for x1, . . . xn, y1, . . . , ym : C
As in the case of its CK-fragment, this system has no elimination rule. One β-rule
associated with the above takes box constructs in the explicit substitutions, and
substitutes them in the term. Another β-rule defines a strange recursive procedure,
where the entire term is somehow substituted for occurences of z in itself. This has
to be done very carefully in order to achieve strong normalization; in particular,
some “doubly diagonal” assumptions need to be avoided.
5. Propositional Lax Logic (PLL), or Computational Logic (CL)
There is a peculiar constructive modality which has arisen in a multitude of
contexts, and thereby repeatedly reinvented. Curry (1952) discovered its rules and
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briefly considered it in the process of trying to prove a deduction theorem for modal
logics. Almost twenty years later, Goldblatt (1981) discovered a similar modality
on topos logic, with the meaning that “it is locally the case that.”
The true link with constructivity was made with the investigations of Moggi
(1991) on the monadic metalanguage; this included a modality-like type construc-
tor, which turns out to be logically equivalent to Curry’s modality, as eventually
shown by Benton et al. (1998), who name it Computational Logic (CL). And then,
only a few years later, Mendler (1993) developed a logic for the verification of
hardware constraits, whose modal propositional fragment turned out to be coincide
with Curry and Moggi. The resulting Propositional Lax Logic (PLL) was studied
in detail by Fairtlough and Mendler (1995, 1997).
Fairtlough and Mendler (1995) characterise the logic by the following axioms:
(©R) A→©A
(©M) ©© A→©A
(©F ) (A→ B)→ (©A→©B)
Equivalently, Fairtlough and Mendler (1997) replace axiom (©F ) with©A∧© →
©(A ∧B), which they refer to as (©S). One may wisely ask what modal rules we
need. It seems that we do not need any! Of course, necessitation is improper in
this setting. Fairtlough and Mendler (1997) suggest a rule which directly follows
from (©F ) and propositional logic. Benton et al. (1998) suggest that we need no
inference rules related to the modality at all.
Almost immediately, one notices that (©F )—or equivalently, (©S)—is charac-
teristic of necessity modalities, usually denoted by a box (), whereas (©R) and
(©M) of a possibility modality, commonly denoted as aa diamond (♦). What kind
of modality is this, then? Fairtlough and Mendler (1997) note that, in a classical
context, ¬©A is true, whether © =  or © = ♦. But then, we have that
©A implies © (A ∧ ⊥) implies ©A ∧©⊥ implies ©⊥ implies ⊥ implies A
and hence
A↔©A
That is, © cannot be either a classical diamond, or a classical box.
5.1. Moggi’s calculus. The natural deduction system for PLL/CL was discovered
by Moggi (1989, 1991), and it is—at least compared to the other logics we survey—
largely uncontroversial. The introduction rule simply takes values of type A to
computations of type ©A:
Γ ⊢M : A
Γ ⊢ val M :©A
Under no circumstances should we be allowed to coerce such a computation back
to its previous state as a value. This is because there are more things of type ♦A
than just values of A. Moggi’s motivation is to use the ♦ types to isolate a part
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of the language which may have side effects. Thus, we may also consider impure
elements of type ♦A.
But recall that, in some abstract sense, we know how to sequentially compose
side effects. The elimination rule reflects this intuition: if we can use a value of type
A to produce a computation of type ©B, we may as well plug in a computation of
type ©A for that value. The resulting term first performs the side-effects that go
into ©A, and then the ones embedded in the term of type ©B:
Γ ⊢M :©A Γ, x : A ⊢ N :©B
Γ ⊢ let val x =M in N :©B
The β-rule is predictable:
let val x = val M in N −→ N [M/x]
The above natural deduction system, as well as equivalent sequent calculus and
Hilbert-style formulations are studied by Benton et al. (1998). A sequent calcu-
lus is also discussed by Fairtlough and Mendler (1997), but their main focus is on
the Kripke models for PLL/CL. In (Fairtlough and Mendler, 2002), the inhabita-
tion problem for PLL/CL is discussed, as well as its interpretation as a logic of
‘constraint contexts.’ Goubault-Larrecq et al. (2008) discuss a notion of logical
relation appropriate for Moggi’s monadic metalanguage.
5.2. Pfenning & Davies’ lax λ-calculus. After presenting their dual-context
calculus DCS4, for which see §2.6, Pfenning and Davies (2001) spend the second
half of their paper discussing PLL/CL. Using, once more, the quasi-philosophical
approach of Martin-Lo¨f (1996), they ‘judgmentally reconstruct’ lax logic, yielding
a λ-calculus that is almost identical to Moggi’s, yet with a subtle distinction in the
types of sequents, some are regular sequents, notated as usual, whereas some are
lax, written Γ ⊢ E ∼ A. Regular sequents imply lax sequents:
Γ ⊢M : A
Γ ⊢M ∼ A
We are only allowed to introduce the modality only if we have such a lax sequent:
Γ ⊢ E ∼ A
Γ ⊢ E :©A
Finally, the elimination rule substitutes a term of type ©A into a lax sequent:
Γ ⊢M :©A Γ, x : A ⊢ N ∼ B
Γ ⊢ let val x =M in N ∼ B
This may seem like a silly game to play, but there is a subtlety that is easy to miss:
well-typed terms M which appear in a lax sequent Γ ⊢M ∼ A are also elements of
the syntactic category E of proof expressions, defined by
E ::= M | let val x =M in E
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The importance of this becomes obvious once we glance at the β-rule:
let val x = val E in N −→ N〈E/x〉
As E is a proof expression, we can define the substitution operator N〈E/x〉 by
induction on E, instead of the more common pattern of induction on N . There are
two clauses, one for regular terms, and one for let val constructs:
N〈M/x〉
def
= N [M/x]
N〈let val y =M in E/x〉
def
= let val y =M in N〈E/x〉
This adjustment to Moggi’s system actually removes the need for its one commuting
conversion.
5.3. Categorical semantics of PLL/CL. The semantics of PLL/CLL is simple
and natural: it consist of a cartesian closed category, with the modality © being
the functor part of a monad, say (©, η, µ). However, Moggi (1989) remarks this is
not quite enough by itself: it is required that this be a strong monad, in the sense
of Kock (1972). A strength, in this context, is a natural transformation
stA,B : A×©B →©(A×B)
satisfying some appropriate coherence conditions.
Computationally speaking, the strength corresponds to the ability to ‘impurify’
any A, in order to include it as part of an impure computation ©B, finally yield-
ing ©(A × B). Following this setup, Moggi (1989, 1991) obtains soundness and
completeness.
5.4. The subtle relationship to CS4. Suppose we have full CS4, diamond modal-
ity included. Then, let us throw in axioms A→ A. Combined with the T axiom,
this trivialises the  modality, in the sense that A↔ A. However, if we set
©
def
= ♦
then it is not very hard to see that the resulting logic satisfies the axioms of PLL/CL.
This is not a mere coincidence. Alechina et al. (2001) showed that, if one takes
Kripke models for CS4, and requires that they satisfy the semantic counterpart of
A→ A (namely, the accessibility relation is hereditary), then one obtains sound
and complete Kripke semantics for PLL/CL. It also seems like this semantics coin-
cides with the original Kripke semantics given in Fairtlough and Mendler (1997).
More importantly, this does not appear to be an artifact of the Kripke semantics:
the rabbit hole goes deeper, for the correspondence is mirrored on the categorical
level. To quote Alechina et al. (with the emphasis being our doing):
In the logic, PLL arises as a special case of CS4 when we assume
the derivability of A→ A. A similar statement holds in category
theory. We have an inclusion functor from the category of PLL-
categories into the category of CS4-categories: each PLL-category
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is a CS4-category where the comonad is the identity functor. Con-
versely, each CS4-category such that A is isomorphic to A is a
[sic] CS4-category.
It follows, the authors argue, that © really is a possibility modality.
Further evidence of this deep relationship is provided by Pfenning and Davies
(2001), who embed their lax λ-calculus into DCS4 (see §2.6) The key rests in the
following translation of types, where we write ⇒ for implication in PLL:
A⇒ B
def
= A→ B
©A
def
= ♦A
The rules of PLL then become derivable rules of CS4.3
6. Constructive Linear Temporal Logic (CLTL)
Whilst developing calculi for CS4, Davies and Pfenning (1996, 1999, 2001) no-
ticed that their type systems enforced an important restriction: their calculi could
not manipulate code that is not closed, i.e. code that has free ‘value’/dynamic
variables, see (Davies and Pfenning, 2001, §8).
That is, if we have a term of shape box M at hand, then all of its free vari-
ables are of modal type. This is a very useful property to know when practicing
metaprogramming: we know that this term only depends on code, i.e. only depends
on static data, and we are thus ready to generate code for it. This generation pro-
cess may involve some static analysis or local optimizations applied to M , but the
calculus shall not control those: they will happen once we compile to some other
language—see e.g. the survey by Wickline et al. (1998). The calculus is there only
to help us ascertain that things labelled static depend only on other static data.
As a result, no unbound dynamic variables will be encountered upon evaluation.
However, there is a lot of interest in a much more simple and direct kind of
metaprogramming, namely that of symbolic execution. Consider a term M with
one a free dynamic variable, x. We would like to be able to reduce M whilst
carrying x around as an unevaluated ‘symbol’ until M is as simple as we would
like it to be. A classic example is that of the exponential function: suppose we
have a term expt such that expt x n evalutes to xn. We would like some ‘logical
mechanism’ by which we can rewrite expt to some term expt′, and then ‘partially
evaluate’ expt′ x 3, reducing it to x∗x∗x. Furthermore, we would like to do this not
as a static analysis on compiled code—as languaged based on CS4 allow us to do—
but in a controlled manner within the modal calculus. This is metaprogramming
with open variables.
3An inference rule is derivable just if, from a proof of the assumptions, a finite sequence of steps
consisting of instances of rules can build a proof of the conclusion. In contrast, an inference rule
is admissible just if, whenever there exists a proof of the assumptions, then there exists a proof
of the conclusion.
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To achieve this kind of manipulation, we need to replace the  modality with
something which has a more temporal flavour, and which we write ©. This inno-
vation belongs to Davies (1995, 1996), who devised a different system, λ©. The
system itself is a more radical departure than anything we have discussed up to
this point. The main departure is that both assumptions and sequents are timed.
Sequents are of the form
Γ ⊢n M : A
The above sequent can be read as follows: at time n, term M has type A, under
the assumptions Γ. But assumptions in Γ are also timed: the assignment x : An
means that x is a variable of type A at time n. One can only use variables which
are available at the ‘current’ time:
(x : An) ∈ Γ
Γ ⊢n x : A
Accordingly, we may only λ-abstract a variable that is currently available. Moving
a time step backwards into the past or a step forwards into the future is effected
by the rules for the modality ©. If we can infer A in the next moment, then we
can infer that ©A (‘in the next step A’):
Γ ⊢n+1 M : A
Γ ⊢n next M :©A
Similarly, if we can infer ©A at some point, then we can infer A at the preceding
step:
Γ ⊢n M :©A
Γ ⊢n+1 prev M : A
These two constructs give rise to temporal β-redices, namely
prev (next M)→M
and temporal η-redices, namely
next (prev M)→M
The natural numbers that decorate sequents carry a very strong flavour of time, and
can also be understood as delimiting the stage of a computation. This intuition was
formalized by Davies (1996), who proved a time-ordered normalization theorem:
suppose Γ ⊢n M : A has no temporal redices, and no subterm whose derivation
is labelled with time less than n′. Then, reducing a β-redex labelled with time n′
followed by reducing all resultant temporal redices does not create β-redices with
time less than n′. In other words: reducing a β-redex of minimal time and then
cancelling prev’s with next’s will not produce a redex of lesser time.
6.1. Logical Aspects. Davies (1995, 1996) claims to have drawn inspiration for
the design of λ© through the Curry-Howard isomorphism:
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“Putting this all together naturally suggests that constructive linear-
time temporal logic with© and a type system for multi-level binding-
time analysis should be images of each other under the Curry-
Howard isomorphism.”
Indeed, in (Davies, 1996) it is shown that there exists a term M such that
⊢0 M : A if and only if there is a proof of A in a very small fragment of classical
Linear Temporal Logic (LTL). This fragment is known as L© and is due to Stirling
(Stirling, 1992, p. 516). Axiomatically, L© consists of the normality axiom©(A→
B) → (©A → ©B), and the equivalence of ©¬A and ¬© A, along with modus
ponens and necessitation.
However, L© is a classical logic, and hence not an exact match to the type system
of λ©. The exact logic of λ© is intuitionistic and was isolated by Kojima and Igarashi
(2011), who call it Constructive Linear-Time Temporal Logic (CLTL). In op. cit.
the authors study λ© as a natural deduction system, provide an associated sequent
calculus for which they prove cut elimination, and discuss appropriate Kripke se-
mantics. They also provide an axiomatization of CLTL, which consists of all in-
stances of intuitionistic propositional tautologies, as well as the following axioms:
(©K) ©(A→ B)→ (©A→©B)
(©K−1) (©A→©B)→©(A→ B)
under the rules of modus ponens and necessitation.
6.2. Metaprogramming Variants. Attempts to understand, implement and prac-
tice metaprogramming span multiple decades. Early efforts include quasiquotation
in LISP-derived languages, and which date from the mid 1970s (Bawden, 1999);
Ershov’s idea of mixed computation (Ershov, 1982); and the Futamura projections,
discovered in 1971 (Futamura, 1999). The Futamura projections were later elabo-
rated into the theory and practice partial evaluation; see the survey by Jones (1996)
and the book by Jones et al. (1993). These developments began to acquire a logical
foundation in the 1990s, mainly through the use of constructive modalities.
λ© was a seminal language in providing this logical foundation, and it spear-
headed many developments. This is because the constructs next and prev essentially
act like the quote and unquote operators of LISP, as explained in Bawden (1999).
λ© forms the essence of MetaML, a metaprogramming language developed by
Taha and Sheard (1997, 2000). Only two fundamental differents distinguish MetaML
to λ©:
• MetaML implements cross-stage persistence: a variable can be used at a
later stage than its annotation, as the variable rule essentially becomes
(x :n A) ∈ Γ m ≥ n
Γ ⊢m x : A
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• A run construct is forcibly added to the system, with reduction rule
run (next e)→ e
However, this construct is ‘unsafe’—in that one can encounter an bound
runtime variable upon evaluation—and it also comes at a cost in ‘expres-
sivity’; see (Taha and Sheard, 2000, §12).
MetaML was further simplified in a series of papers by Moggi, Taha, Sheard and
Benaissa. First, Moggi et al. (1999) introduced a simplified version called AIM,
short for An Idealized MetaML. Their work was driven by their attempt to find a
categorical semantics for MetaML, a sketch of which may be found in an unpub-
lished manuscript (Benaissa et al., 1998). An even more simplified language, λBN ,
was introduced by the same authors a year later (Benaissa et al., 1999), and their
discussion also included a more refined categorical semantics.
A few years later, Taha and Nielsen (2003) introduced environment classifiers,
a system that, amongst other improvements, constitutes an expansion of λ© from
linear time to branching time. A logical foundation was then developed for this
system by Tsukada and Igarashi (2010).
Following from the work of Moggi et al, Yuse and Igarashi (2006) introduced a
combination of λ© and Davies and Pfenning’s DCS4, called λ©, which combines
the © modality of CLTL and the CS4 modality . The interpretation is straight-
forward, and © is supposed to be read as ‘in the next step’ (or stage), whereas 
is to be read as ‘always’ (or, in all stages). The resulting calculus is somehow sim-
ilar to Moggi et al’s AIM and λBN , but arguably closer to a more Curry-Howard
based interpretation. Nevertheless, not enough effort is put into determining which
fragment of LTL their calculus corresponds to, but they do note that it lacks the
‘induction axiom’ (A→©A)→ (A→ A).
As the reader may witness, metaprogramming with modalities has grown into a
vast field of its own that is still expanding. As such, it will be the main subject
of the second part of the present survey, which Mario Alvarez-Picallo is currently
preparing.
6.3. Categorical Semantics of CLTL. Benaissa et al. (1998) made a start in
analyzing the categorical semantics of various modalities for metaprogramming,
and this included an analysis of λ©. A seemingly ‘conclusive’ analysis is given by
Benaissa et al. (1999): a semantics of CLTL consists of a cartesian-closed category
C and a full and faithful CCC-functor,
F : C →֒ C
A CCC-functor is a finite product preserving (i.e. strong monoidal) functor for
which the canonical arrow F (BA)→ FBFA is an isomorphism.
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